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In this paper, I present a rationale for an inheritance tax from the point of view of 
economic rents derived from ranking value and preference in the state of simultaneous 
optimality of all heterogeneous households. Because there are family lines that have 
different probabilities of persistently obtaining rents, these rents should be sufficiently 
taxed to achieve optimality of all heterogeneous households. Income taxes alone cannot 
completely remove the negative effects of these rents on optimality because it is difficult 
to distinguish between types of income. Therefore, an inheritance tax is necessary to 
complement income taxes. An important point is that the inheritance tax is not a tax on 
capital income—it is a tax on rents. Because sustainable heterogeneity indicates 
optimality in a heterogeneous population, this type of inheritance tax does not distort the 
economy. Rather, unless the negative effects of these rents are sufficiently removed by 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The justification for inheritance taxes has been studied mostly in the framework of the 
theory of optimal taxation. However, the conclusions of these studies are mixed and 
depend greatly on the assumptions used, for example, assumptions on the finiteness of 
life, borrowing constraints, parental behavior, government behavior, the linearity of 
taxation, and heterogeneity in a variety of factors. Therefore, the justifiability of an 
inheritance tax remains an open question.  
 It has been argued that, in general, an inheritance tax should not be levied 
because taxes on capital incomes distort the economy and inheritance taxes can be 
interpreted to be a kind of tax on capital incomes (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Chamley, 
1986; Judd, 1985; Atkeson et al., 1999). However, an inheritance tax (or more broadly a 
tax on capital incomes) can be justified if we introduce certain assumptions, for example, 
that there are borrowing constraints or uninsured idiosyncratic heterogeneity (Aiyagari, 
1995; Conesa et al., 2009), that parents behave according to particular “bequest 
technology” (Cremer et al., 2003), that an inheritance tax is only levied on bequests above 
a certain threshold (Saez, 2013), or that a government maximizes its social welfare 
function, which consists of general social marginal welfare weights for a population that 
has heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities (Piketty and Saez, 2013). These 
assumptions may be economically important, but they may be introduced ad hoc. In any 
case, there is no current consensus on the rationale for an inheritance tax.  
 All of these studies, however, are confined within the traditional framework of 
the theory of optimal taxation. In this paper, I examine the rationale for an inheritance tax 
from a different perspective, specifically, from the point of view of sustainable 
heterogeneity (SH) shown in Harashima (2012, 2014, 2017b)1 and rent incomes derived 
from ranking value and preference shown in Harashima (2017a, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).2  
 SH is defined as the state at which all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. SH can be achieved with appropriate 
government interventions even if households are heterogeneous in preferences and 
behave unilaterally. Conversely, unless a government appropriately intervenes, it is 
difficult to achieve SH. However, if households are heterogeneous only in their 
preferences, government interventions for SH do not necessarily necessitate an 
inheritance tax. Here I show that an inheritance tax is needed if households are 
heterogeneous in their abilities to persistently obtain rent incomes. Harashima (2019a) 
showed that, if these abilities are heterogeneous across households, the government has 
                                                          
1
 Harashima (2017b) is also available in English as Harashima (2010). 
2
 Harashima (2018b) is also available in English as Harashima (2016). 
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to intervene with regard to rent incomes to achieve SH. Furthermore, Harashima (2017a, 
2018c) showed that rent incomes originating from ranking value and preference exist 
widely in the economy, but they are unevenly distributed among households. Because of 
these unevenly distributed rents, the government needs to introduce an inheritance tax to 
achieve SH. An important point is that an inheritance tax achieves SH, and it is not a tax 
on capital incomes but on rents. Therefore, it does not distort the economy.   
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss ranking value and 
preference and their relation to persistent rent incomes. I then explore SH and the 
necessity for government intervention (i.e., an income tax) in Section 3. In Section 4, I 
develop the argument for the necessity of an inheritance tax and discuss types of 
inheritance taxes. Finally, concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.  
 
2  PERSISTENT RENT INCOMES  
 
2.1  Ranking value and preference and rent incomes 
2.1.1  Ranking value and preference 
In this section, the concept of ranking value and preference is explained in brief on the 
basis of the work of Harashima (2017a, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).3  
 
2.1.1.1  Ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. People feel, obtain, or consume value 
when using, enjoying, or consuming goods and services. Values derived from practical 
use have usually been considered in economics, but people also consume values derived 
from ranking. For example, if a curio is evaluated to be the best among a set of similar 
items, its price will become very high relative to those of the others, regardless of whether 
it is practically useful. Its price is so high only because it is the top-ranked item in the 
group. In this sense, people obtain utility not only from practical uses but also from a 
sense of ranking. 
 Therefore, value has two components: practical value and ranking value. 
Practical value is the value that people feel when consuming a good or service for 
practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people feel from the rank of a good or 
service within a set of similar types of goods or services that people use, possess, or 
observe (e.g., the ranking of a book in a best-seller list or that of a professional baseball 
team in a league).  
 
                                                          
3
 Harashima (2018b) is also available in English as Harashima (2016). 
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2.1.1.2  Ranking preference 
Suppose that goods and services have the following properties: quantity, quality, and rank. 
Quality is related to practical value, rank is related to ranking value, and quantity is related 
to both values. Suppose also that the quality and rank of each good or service are given 
exogenously and fixed. Here, for simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good 
or service in the economy, and that all goods or services belong to this type (these goods 
or services are hereafter called “goods” for simplicity) and are substitutable for 
households’ practical uses. Although the goods are substitutable from the point of view 
of practical uses, they are differentiated from the point of view of rank. 
 As first developed in Harashima (2018b), let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of the 
goods. The good with rank R = 1 is most preferred by households, rank R = 2 is the next 
most preferred, and so on. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no tied rank. A 
household’s utility derived from consuming goods with rank R is  
  𝑢(𝑞𝑛,𝑅 , 𝑞𝑙,𝑅 , 𝑅) , 
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the good with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
  𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅) , 
 
where Rq~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the good with rank R, and l,Rn,RR qqq ~ .  
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 𝜕𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)𝜕?̃?𝑅 > 0 
 
and 
  𝜕2𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)𝜕?̃?𝑅2 < 0 . 
 
In addition, for any Rr ,  




  𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 2) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) > 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟, 𝑟) . 
 
2.1.2  Ranking value and superstars 
Ranking value and preference confer monopoly powers and thereby rents (which I call 
“ranking monopoly rents”) to the producers of high-ranking products because selling 
ranking values to consumers requires no additional cost; that is, the marginal cost of 
producing a ranking value is zero. Therefore, producers of highly ranked products can set 
prices above their marginal costs (see Harashima, 2017, 2018b). If households’ ranking 
preference is strong enough, therefore, the highest-rank producer (e.g., the best player in 
a professional sport) can be a superstar. Harashima (2018a) showed that individual 
players in team sports can be also superstars and that the origin of the extremely high 
compensation of superstars in team sports is also ranking value and preference.  
 
2.1.3  Product differentiation and monopoly rents  
The importance of product differentiation has been emphasized in the study of business 
administration. The differentiation strategy is one of the three fundamental strategies in 
Porter’s generic strategies (Porter, 1980, 1985). Harashima (2017a) showed that product 
differentiation is important because it provides firms monopoly powers, profits, and rents 
that originate from household ranking preferences. Because the strategy of product 
differentiation is so important (Porter, 1980, 1985) and is actually pursued by many 
companies, the monopoly rents generated from differentiation will be large and 
widespread across the economy today and in the future. 
 Who should receive the ranking monopoly rents that are derived from product 
differentiation—shareholders, ordinary employees, consumers, or executives? It seems 
reasonable that they should be distributed according to the level of contribution to the 
generation of the ranking monopoly rents, but determining the various levels of 
contribution by the different parties is difficult.  
 The monopoly rents of firms that successfully differentiate their products 
commonly originate in ranking value and preference in much the same way as occurs in 
professional sports. In addition, teams and firms share the common feature that, to obtain 
a higher rank, it is essential to hire more talented employees—in particular, players or 
executives. In these respects, a team and a firm can be seen as the same kind of economic 
agents or organizations in that they are the beneficiaries of households’ ranking 
preferences. Therefore, it is highly likely that the mechanism of executive compensation 
is the same as that for players’ salaries in team sports and that some executives will be 
compensated like superstars in team sports.  
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 This does not mean that none of the ranking monopoly rent is distributed to 
shareholders, ordinary employees, or consumers. Indeed, it is quite likely that some of 
these rents are also distributed, for example, to shareholders in the form of share dividends 
and capital gains. 
 
2.2  Persistent rent incomes 
2.2.1  Family lines 
It is likely that there are family lines (FLs) and that some of these will consist of 
households that are descended from common ancestors and that share similar traits. In 
addition, in accordance with custom and for other reasons, many groups of people mostly 
marry within the same or similar groups. Various abilities are exogenously given to 
people, but the distribution is biased. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume for simplicity 
that there are different FLs consisting of households that commonly share a given 
probability of obtaining ranking monopoly rents; moreover, this probability differs from 
the probabilities of households in other FLs. 
 Here, I examine ranking monopoly rents in an economy with FLs that are 
heterogeneous in the probability of obtaining those rents.  
 
2.2.2  Homogeneous FLs 
Before examining the case of heterogeneous FLs, I first examine the case of homogeneous 
FLs for comparison. Suppose that there are two FLs (FL1 and FL2). Each FL equally 
consists of N (= 1,2,3, …, N) households. A generation of each household lives only one 
period, but any household continues to exist over many generations indefinitely (i.e., there 
are equivalently indefinitely living households). Any household in both FLs equally 
obtains ranking monopoly rents (𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧 + 𝜖𝑡 ) in period t (i.e., during the period of 
generation t) with probability 12𝑁; that is, one and only one of 2N households in the two 
FLs on average obtains 𝑧𝑡 in period t where z is a constant and 𝜖𝑡 is i.i.d. with mean 
zero. In other words, any household obtains ranking monopoly rents in every 2N 
generations on average. Note that obtaining ranking monopoly rents means that, for 
example, in a given generation, a member of a household obtains a post as high-ranking 
executive in a large company and earns a very high level of compensation. If a household 
cannot obtain ranking monopoly rents in period t (i.e., during the period of generation t), 
its incomes decreases by 
𝑧𝑡2𝑁−1 in this period (generation) because economic rents 
indicate transfers of incomes between households, and those transfers are unrelated to 
production costs.  
 For any household in either FL, the expected net ranking monopoly rents (i.e., 
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the expected 𝑧𝑡 minus expected 𝑧𝑡2𝑁−1) are  
   𝐸(𝑧𝑡) = 12𝑁 𝑧 − (1 − 12𝑁) 𝑧2𝑁 − 1 = 0 , 
 
where E is the expectation operator. That is, the expected net ranking monopoly rents are 
zero for any household in either FL, which indicates that 𝑧𝑡 has no persistent effect. 
Hence, if all households are homogeneous, any ranking monopoly rents are interpreted to 
be “temporarily” obtained. 
 
2.2.3  Heterogeneous FLs 
Next, I examine the case of heterogeneous FLs. In this case, the two FLs are identical 
except for the probability of obtaining ranking monopoly rents. Each household in FL1 
obtains ranking monopoly rents in a period with probability 
23𝑁  (in other words, it 
obtains them in every 
3𝑁2  generations on average). On the other hand, each household 
in FL2 obtains them in a period with probability 
13𝑁 (in other words, it obtains them 
once in every 3N generations on average). The probability of obtaining rents in 
households in FL1 is therefore two times higher than that of households in FL2. On 
average, one and only one of 2N households in the two FLs obtains 𝑧𝑡 in each period. 
 For a household in FL1, the expected ranking monopoly rents are  
  𝐸(𝑧𝑡) = 23𝑁 𝑧 − (1 − 23𝑁) 𝑧2𝑁 − 1 = 𝑧6𝑁 − 2 > 0 , 
 
and those for a household in FL2 are  
  𝐸(𝑧𝑡) = 13𝑁 𝑧 − (1 − 13𝑁) 𝑧2𝑁 − 1 = − 𝑧6𝑁 − 2 < 0 . 
 
Therefore, the expected ranking monopoly rents of a household in FL1 are positive but 
those in FL2 are negative, and unlike the case of a homogeneous population, ranking 
monopoly rents have persistent effects.  
 At first glance, ranking monopoly rents may look like temporarily (or “luckily”) 
obtained incomes because they can only be intermittently obtained by any household. 
However, they can have persistent effects as shown above and are actually “persistently” 
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obtained rent incomes when households are heterogeneous in the probability of obtaining 
ranking monopoly rents.  
 
2.2.4  Definition of persistently obtained ranking monopoly rents 
The natures of ranking monopoly rents are different depending on whether FLs are 
homogeneous or heterogeneous. If FLs are homogeneous, ranking monopoly rents are 
temporary incomes, whereas they are persistent if FLs are heterogeneous because the 𝐸(𝑧𝑡) of households in at least one FL must be positive if FLs are heterogeneous. The 
heterogeneity in abilities across FLs ultimately generates the persistent nature of ranking 
monopoly rents.  
 Consequently, we can define the “persistence” of ranking monopoly rents by 
whether or not the FLs are heterogeneous in their abilities. In this paper, ranking 
monopoly rents are considered to be persistent if FLs are heterogeneous in their abilities. 
The rents are temporary if the FLs are homogeneous in their abilities.   
 
2.3  Temporary rents and other forms of persistent rents 
Persistently obtained rent incomes are not limited to persistently obtained ranking 
monopoly rents. For example, there are rents obtained from natural monopolies or from 
natural resources like land and oil. I call these various kinds of persistently obtained rent 
incomes as a whole “persistent rent incomes.”  
 Furthermore, the definition of persistent rent incomes given in Section 2.2.4 
indicates that there are also temporary rent incomes. If the probability of obtaining any 
rent income is identical in all heterogeneous households, it is considered to be temporary 
rent income. There are many examples of temporary tent incomes, including lottery prizes 
and other one-time “lucky” occurrences that can affect profits and incomes.  
 Persistent rent incomes can be purchased by and exchanged with other 
households. Furthermore, a household can exchange its temporary rent incomes for 
various forms of persistent rent incomes; for example, they can buy shares of companies 
or land (some parts of share dividends and capital gains from shares are types of 
persistently obtained ranking monopoly rents). An owner of temporary rent incomes 
therefore can become an owner of persistent rent incomes.  
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY AND 
INCOME TAX 
 
3.1  Sustainable heterogeneity 
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In this section, I explain SH briefly on the basis of the work of Harashima (2012, 2014, 
2017b, 2019a).4  
 
3.1.1  The SH model 
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two economies―Economy 1 and Economy 2—
that are identical except for the rate of time preference (RTP). Each economy consists of 
its own identical households, respectively. Let θ1 and θ2 be the RTPs of households in 
Economies 1 and 2, respectively, and θ1 < θ2. The population growth rate is zero in both 
economies. The two economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a 
combined economy. The combined economy can be interpreted as the world economy 
(the international interpretation) or the national economy (the national interpretation). 
Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used only for international transactions, 
but because both national and international interpretations are possible, this concept and 
terminology are also used for the national economy model in this paper. 
 Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod-neutral technological progress, 
the production function of Economy i is assumed to be  
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼 
 
for i = 1 or 2, where yi,t and ki,t are the per capita production and capital, respectively, of 
Economy i in period t; At is the technology in period t; and α ( 0 < α < 1) is a constant. 
The current account balance in Economy 1 is τt and that in Economy 2 is –τt. The 
accumulated current account balance 
 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
 
mirrors capital flows between the two economies, and the economy with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other economy. Since 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡  (= 𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡) are returns on 
investments,  
 𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0   and  𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
                                                          
4
 Harashima (2017b) is also available in English as Harashima (2010). 
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represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other 
economy. Hence,  
 𝜏𝑡 − 𝜕𝑦2,𝑡𝜕𝑘2,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0  
 
is the balance on goods and services of Economy 1, and  
 𝜕𝑦1,𝑡𝜕𝑘1,𝑡 ∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑡0 − 𝜏𝑡 
 
is that of Economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between 
the economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
  𝜏𝑡 = 𝜅(𝑘1,𝑡, 𝑘2,𝑡) . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization under the 
international interpretation) can intervene in the activities of Economies 1 and 2 by 
transferring money between the two economies. The amount of transfer from Economy 1 
to Economy 2 in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital, such that  
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
g̅𝑡 is an exogenous variable for households and firms and is appropriately adjusted by the 
government (or an international supranational organization) in every period so as to 
achieve SH. Because 𝑘1,𝑡 = 𝑘2,𝑡 and ?̇?1,𝑡 = ?̇?2,𝑡, 
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
 Each household in Economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 





 𝑑𝑘1,𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝐴𝛼𝑘1,𝑡1−𝛼 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝛼𝑘1,𝑡−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑡0 𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) − 𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 , 
 
and each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp∞0 (−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
   𝑑𝑘2,𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝐴𝛼𝑘2,𝑡1−𝛼 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝛼𝑘2,𝑡−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑡0 𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) + 𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 , 
 
where ci,t is the per capita consumption of Economy i in period t, ui is the utility function 
of Economy i, and E is the expectation operator. 
 
3.1.2  SH 
Harashima (2017b) showed in an endogenous growth framework that, if and only if lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?1,𝑡𝑐1,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?2,𝑡𝑐2,𝑡  = constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied (i.e., SH is achieved). Even if the government does not intervene (i.e., g̅𝑡 = 0), 
SH is achieved if the economies behave multilaterally in the sense that each economy 
behaves fully considering the optimality conditions of the other economy. On the other 
hand, if the economies behave unilaterally in the sense that an economy behaves without 
considering the other economy’s optimality conditions, SH is not achieved unless a 
government appropriately intervenes. The reason why SH can be achieved in the cases of 
multilateral behaviors and appropriate government intervention is that the capital 
accumulation of the more advantaged Economy 1 is restrained by the multilateral 
behavior and appropriate government intervention. If SH is achieved, the growth rates of 
consumption in both economies are equal:  
 lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?1,𝑡𝑐1,𝑡 = lim𝑡→∞ ?̇?2,𝑡𝑐2,𝑡 = 𝜀−1 [(𝜛𝛼𝑚v)𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃1 + 𝜃22 ]  ,                   (1) 
 
where m, v, and 𝜛 are positive constants, and 𝜀 = − 𝑐1,𝑡𝑢1′′𝑢1′  = − 𝑐2,𝑡𝑢2′′𝑢2′  is the degree of 
relative risk aversion and is constant.  
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 Harashima (2017b) indicated that SH also exists, even in the framework of 
exogenous growth (e.g., Ramsey-type growth models) with a heterogeneous population. 
The capital accumulation of the more advantaged Economy 1 is also restrained at SH in 
exogenous growth models. Hence, the capital (wealth) that a household in Economy 1 
owns at SH is not k1 but k1 + Ψ, where Ψ is a negative constant, and the capital that a 
household in Economy 2 owns at SH is not k2 but k2 – Ψ, where ki,t is identical for any i 
through market arbitration (i.e., ki,t = kt for any i).  
 Note that Harashima (2017b) showed that the two-economy model can be easily 
extended to multi-economy models, and the results in multi-economy models are 
basically the same as those in the two-economy model. 
 
3.2  Government intervention 
3.2.1  Government intervention when no rent income exists 
Harashima (2012) showed that, if a government intervenes such that 
  lim 𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2 − 𝜃12  , 
 
then SH is achieved even if Economy 1 behaves unilaterally, and equation (1) is satisfied.5 
When SH is achieved, Economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined economy (Economy 
1+2) with twice the population and an RTP of 𝜃1+𝜃22 . Suppose that there is a third 
economy with RTP of θ3, and it is identical to Economies 1 and 2 except for its RTP. 
Because Economy 1+2 has twice the population of Economy 3, if a government 
intervenes such that the amount of (positive or negative) transfers from a household in 
Economy 1+2 to households in Economy 3 in period t is g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘3,𝑡=g̅𝑡𝑘𝑡 ,6  SH is 
achieved where k3,t is capital in Economy 3 in period t, and  
  lim 𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡 = 𝜃3 − 𝜃1+𝜃223  . 
 
Remember that ki,t is identical for any i through arbitration, as shown in Section 3.1.2. By 
iterating similar procedures, if a government’s (positive or negative) transfers from a 
household in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to households in Economy H are made by  
 
                                                          
5
 Households in Economy 2 share the transfers equally with each other. 
6
 Households in Economy 3 share the transfers equally with each other. 
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 lim𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡 = 𝜃𝐻 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝐻−1𝑞=1𝐻 − 1𝐻  , 
 
then SH is achieved.7  
 
3.2.2  Government intervention when rent incomes exist 
Harashima (2019a) showed that SH is achieved even if the government does nothing with 
regard to rent incomes if they are temporary. If they are persistent, however, SH cannot 
be achieved unless the government appropriately intervenes. In this section, I briefly 
explain how a government should intervene for persistent rent incomes on the basis of the 
work of Harashima (2019a).  
 Suppose for simplicity that there are only two FLs and there is only one 
household in each of the two FLs. The households in both FLs are identical except for 
RTP and the probability of obtaining rent incomes. Only the household in FL1 obtains 
rent incomes zt in period t. As a result, the incomes of the household in FL2 are reduced 
by zt in period t. Suppose also that the household in FL1 obtains zt in every period; that 
is, zt is persistent and that 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡  where 𝑧̅  is a constant. In this case, if the 
government appropriately controls the value of g̅𝑡 and  
 lim𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡 = 𝑧̅ + 𝜃2 − 𝜃12  ,                                                  (2) 
 
SH is achieved. That is, if rent incomes are persistent, fiscal transfers from the household 
in FL1 to the one in FL2 by 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡 are needed to achieve SH in addition to the 
transfers for heterogeneous preferences. 
 
3.3  Income tax on persistent rent incomes 
Next, I examine how a government should impose income tax on zt based on the two-FL 
model used in Section 2 in which there are N households and a household in FL1 obtains 
zt in a period with probability 
23𝑁 and that in FL2 obtains zt in a period with probability 13𝑁, with zt defined as persistent rent incomes, as defined in Section 2.2.4. Suppose for 
simplicity that there is no technological progress and 𝑘𝑖,𝑡  is constant for any t, and 
thereby 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧 + 𝜖, as was also the case in Section 2.2. 
                                                          
7
 Households in Economy H share the transfers equally with each other. 
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 The result in Section 2.2 suggests that one of the easiest ways to impose income 
taxes on zt is that any household in FL1 pays income taxes 
𝑧6𝑁−2 in any period (i.e., 
even in the periods when it does not obtain zt), and money equivalent to 
𝑧6𝑁−2 is 
transferred to each household in FL2 in any period (i.e., even in the periods when it 
obtains zt). However, this kind of income tax will not be practically feasible because it is 
difficult for a government to correctly know which FL a household belongs to. In addition, 
this income tax will not be supported by households in FL1 because income taxes are 
imposed on them on zt in any period, regardless of whether they actually obtained zt. At 
the same time, households in FL2 constantly receive transfers in any period regardless of 
whether they obtained zt. 
 Another possible way is to impose income taxes on zt only when a household 
obtains zt. These income taxes on zt are imposed in any period but only on the household 
that actually obtains zt in each period, regardless of FL. In this case, the tax rate on zt 
should be 100% for the following reason. Suppose that the tax rate is χ (0 < χ ≤ 1) and the 
amount of income tax is χzt. If 0 < χ < 1,  
  lim𝑡→∞ g̅𝑡 = 𝜒𝑧̅ + 𝜃2 − 𝜃12 < 𝑧̅ + 𝜃2 − 𝜃12  , 
 
and therefore equation (2) cannot be satisfied. It is only when 𝜒 = 1 that equation (2) 
can be satisfied and SH can be achieved.  
 
4  NECESSITY OF AN INHERITANCE TAX 
 
4.1  Difficulty in estimating zt 
Even if a government decides to impose an income tax on zt, restricting it to only 
households that obtain zt in each period, another problem arises. Before imposing an 
income tax on zt, a government has to distinguish between zt and other household income, 
particularly between persistent and temporary rent incomes. In other words, the 
government would ideally know the exact and correct value of zt in each period. However, 
in reality, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between persistent and temporary rent 
incomes, or in other words, to estimate how much luck contributed to a household’s 
current income. Correctly distinguishing between them would require observing and 
intensely analyzing the incomes of all households in all FLs over many generations in 
detail. 
 Faced with this difficulty, it seems highly likely that a government will make a 
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conservative estimate of the value of zt (i.e., a relatively smaller one) because households 
will be much less satisfied (angrier) if zt and the corresponding income tax are 
overestimated than if they are underestimated. Therefore, a government will more greatly 
fear the case of overestimating zt than that of underestimating it.  
 
4.2  Unrealized capital gains 
The basic mechanism of achieving SH through government interventions is that the 
capital accumulation of a household in FL1 is compulsorily restrained and that in a 
household in FL2 is enhanced by the government. This mechanism implies that taxation 
implemented to achieve SH should target not only income but also capital owned by 
households. This aspect is important if there are incomes that cannot be easily identified 
by the government. Suppose that two households obtain the same amount of incomes that 
are recognized by the government, but in addition to these incomes, one of the two 
households also obtains incomes that cannot be identified by government and therefore 
not taxed. In this case, although the amount of income taxes imposed are the same for 
both households, the capital held by the two households will grow differently, which 
means that the mechanism of achieving SH cannot work if it only depends on an income 
tax.  
 Do uneasily identifiable incomes exist? Unfortunately, they do, for example, as 
unrealized capital gains. In many countries, capital gains are not taxed until they are 
realized because, from a practical standpoint, it is difficult to tax unrealized capital gains. 
Hence, if a household keeps a large amount of capital gains unrealized over generations, 
it can evade a large amount of income tax in the absence of government intervention. As 
a result, that household’s capital accumulation cannot be sufficiently controlled by the 
government to achieve SH.  
 
4.3  Inheritance tax as a necessity to achieve SH 
If income taxes are not necessarily sufficient as a tool to achieve SH for the reasons 
discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, another type of tax that can help achieve SH is needed. 
One such tax is the inheritance tax. 
  
4.3.1  Potential of an inheritance tax 
If a variable and its components fluctuate largely (in this case, income and its component 
parts), it can be difficult to distinguish between the component elements (in this case, 
persistent and temporary incomes). Flow variables can fluctuate widely, and income is a 
flow variable. On the other hand, stock variables generally do not fluctuate as widely, and 
capital is a stock variable. Hence, the difficulty in distinguishing between the components 
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in capital will be much lower than it is for income. For example, if the capital owned by 
a household in a FL persistently deviates upwards from the average over many 
generations, it is highly likely that that capital is being accumulated largely as a result of 
persistent rent incomes because a household generally will not have a run of 
extraordinarily good luck over many generations. 
 Because the tax base of an inheritance tax is made up of assets that are roughly 
equivalent to capital, the problem of distinguishing between the temporary and persistent 
components will be much smaller in the case of inheritance tax than it will be in the case 
of an income tax. A government will be able to at least roughly correctly estimate 
accumulated capital resulting from persistent rent incomes by observing a household’s 
capital holdings. Because of this nature, an inheritance tax has the potential to be a useful 
supplement to the income tax to achieve SH. The importance of the ability of a 
government to distinguish between components is particularly important when it sets 
inheritance tax exemptions, as is discussed in Section 4.6.2. 
 
4.3.2  Necessity of an inheritance tax 
Suppose again that there are two FLs and that there is only one household in each FL. In 
addition, time is discrete and there is no technological progress. For simplicity, assume 
that any generation of a household in each FL equally lives for only one period, and only 
the household in FL1 obtains persistent rent incomes zt and that it obtains them in every 
period (i.e., in every generation). The government underestimates 𝑧̅ and cannot identify 
part of 𝑧̅ for the reasons discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Therefore, income taxes are 
imposed according to  
 
g̅𝑡 = (𝑧̅ − ?̌?) + 𝜃2 − 𝜃12  ,                                            (3) 
 
where ?̌? is a constant, 𝑧̅ − ?̌? indicates the underestimated amount of rent income, and 0 < ?̌? < 𝑧.̅ Equation (3) indicates that the amount of income taxes will be less than the 
necessary amount for SH because equation (2) must be satisfied to achieve SH. Note that 
per capita capital used (not owned) by FL1 and FL2 are still 𝑘1,𝑡 and 𝑘2,𝑡, respectively, 
and that 𝑘1,𝑡 =  𝑘2,𝑡 . 8  Because the income tax is imposed following equation (3), 
however, the household in FL1 owns more capital than 𝑘1,𝑡, and the household in FL2 
owns less capital than 𝑘2,𝑡. 
 To achieve SH, therefore, the government introduces an inheritance tax in 
                                                          
8
 Capitals (equivalently, machines, equipment, and so on) can be used by households (workers) even if 
these capitals are not owned by them. 
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addition to the income tax. The inheritance tax is imposed on the households in both FLs 
in every period (equivalently for every generation) such that the amount of inheritance 
tax for the household in FL1 is 
  𝛿(𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 − ?̅?) , 
 
and that for FL2 is  
   𝛿(𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̅?) , 
 
where δ (0 < δ ≤ 1) is the constant inheritance tax rate and ?̅? is the constant tax exemption 
that is common to both FLs. 𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 and 𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑘2,𝑡 indicate the respective capital 
(assets) of households in FL1 and FL2 after paying the income tax (𝑧̅ − ?̌?)𝑘1,𝑡  and 
receiving the transfers with regard to heterogeneous RTPs. The tax exemption is set to 
satisfy   
  𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑘2,𝑡 < ?̅? < 𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
Because the value of 𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̅? is negative, the household in FL2 is exempted 
from the inheritance tax, and it instead receives a transfer equivalent to the amount of the 
inheritance tax on the household in FL1 from the government. Therefore, because of the 
inheritance tax, the capital owned by the household in FL1 is reduced from 𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 
to (1 − 𝛿)(𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡), but that owned by the household in FL2 is unchanged (i.e., 𝑘2,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑘2,𝑡 ) before receiving the positive government transfers with regard to the 
inheritance tax.  
 For simplicity, suppose that the amount of ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 is constant such that 
 ?̌?𝑘1,𝑡 = ?̌??̃?1 = 𝑧𝑅 = constant                                           (4) 
 
for any t where ?̃?1,𝑡 is 𝑘1,𝑡 at SH in the case that there is no persistent rent income, and 
that for any t, 
  ?̅? < 𝑘1,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑅 = 𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌??̃?1 .                                          (5) 
 
Because time is discrete and there is no technological progress,  
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 𝑘1,𝑡+1 = 𝑘1,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑅 − 𝛿(𝑘1,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑅 − ?̅?) = (1 − 𝛿)(𝑘1,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑅) + 𝛿?̅? . 
 
By iteration, 
 𝑘1,𝑡+2 = (1 − 𝛿)(𝑘1,𝑡+1 + 𝑧𝑅) + 𝛿?̅? 
∙ 
∙  𝑘1,𝑡+𝑚 = (1 − 𝛿)(𝑘1,𝑡+𝑚−1 + 𝑧𝑅) + 𝛿?̅? , 
and thereby,  
  𝑘1,𝑡+𝑚 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑚𝑘1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑧𝑅 ∑(1 − 𝛿)𝑞−1𝑚𝑞=1 + 𝛿?̅? ∑(1 − 𝛿)𝑞−1𝑚𝑞=1  . 
 
Hence,  lim𝑚→∞𝑘1,𝑡+𝑚 = 𝑧𝑅 (1 − 𝛿𝛿 ) + ?̅? = constant.                                (6) 
 
Equation (6) indicates that the capital owned by the household in FL1 does not explode 
but eventually converges at a certain constant value, that is, 𝑧𝑅 (1−𝛿𝛿 ) + ?̅?.  
 By equations (4) and (6), if the tax rate is set to be  
 𝛿 = ?̌??̃?1?̌??̃?1 + ?̃?1 − ?̅?  ,                                                 (7) 
 
then 
 lim𝑚→∞𝑘1,𝑡+𝑚 = ?̃?1 .                                                  (8) 
 
If equations (7) and (8) are satisfied and the revenues from the inheritance tax are 
appropriately transferred to the household in FL2, SH is achieved. Let the tax rate that 
satisfies equation (7) (the “SH tax rate”) be 𝛿𝑆𝐻 . By equation (7), as the value of ?̅? 
approaches the value of ?̃?1, 𝛿𝑆𝐻 approaches its upper bound (i.e., unity), and if ?̅? = ?̃?1, 𝛿𝑆𝐻 = 1. If ?̅? = 0, 𝛿𝑆𝐻 = ?̌?1+?̌?, and if ?̅? > ?̃?1, the SH tax rate cannot be set because δ ≤ 
1.  
 Equation (8) indicates that the capital owned by the household in FL1 will not 
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deviate upwards largely from that owned by the household in FL2 if the inheritance tax 
rate is the SH tax rate. With the appropriate tax rate, therefore, an inheritance tax can 
supplement the income tax to achieve SH. In this sense, it may be seen as the final “safety 
net” for achieving SH.  
 An important point is that the state indicated by SH is efficient because all of the 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied. In addition, the 
inheritance tax for achieving SH is not a tax on capital incomes, but rather it is a tax on 
rents. That is, the inheritance tax does not hinder efficiency. On the contrary, it is a 
necessity for efficiency because SH cannot be achieved without it.  
 
4.4  Way to set the SH tax rate approximately 
Equations (7) and (8) indicate that before setting δ, a government needs to know the value 
of ?̌?. It will, however, be difficult to set δ for similar reasons as those discussed in Section 
4.1 for the value of zt in the case of an income tax. If δ is incorrectly set such that 𝛿 <𝛿𝑆𝐻 , increases in capital of the household in FL1 will accelerate, and SH cannot be 
achieved. If it is incorrectly set in the opposite direction such that 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑆𝐻, 𝑘1,𝑡 will 
decrease to ?̅?, which also means that SH cannot be achieved because ?̅? < 𝑘1,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑅 for 
any t as indicated in inequality (5) and thereby ?̅? < ?̃?1. Moreover, as shown in Section 
4.3.2, if ?̅? > ?̃?1, the SH tax rate cannot be set. How can a government solve this problem? 
 Harashima (2019b)9 showed that, in the case of heterogeneous preferences, if a 
government in a democratic society adjusts the transfers for SH to make the number of 
votes cast in elections in response to increases in the level of economic inequality 
equivalent to the number cast in response to decreases, then SH can be approximately 
achieved. In addition, in the case of heterogeneous abilities of obtaining persistent rent 
incomes, the value of δ will be able to be set in the same manner. If the value of δ is set 
in this manner, it will be approximately equal to 𝛿𝑆𝐻 and SH will be approximately 
achieved. 
 
4.5  Progressiveness  
4.5.1  Does progressiveness matter? 
As shown in Section 4.3, if ?̅? = ?̃?1, 𝛿𝑆𝐻 = 1. This implies that the progressiveness in 
the inheritance tax rate does not matter if ?̅? is set appropriately; that is, it is enough to 
set the single tax rate, 𝛿𝑆𝐻 = 1. However, in actuality, ?̅? will not be set equal to ?̃?1 
because the problem with distinguishing the persistent and temporary elements of capital, 
although much smaller than in the case of the income tax, will still exist to some extent. 
                                                          
9
 Harashima (2019b) is also available in English as Harashima (2018d). 
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In particular, if 𝑧𝑡 is small, it will be difficult to distinguish the effect of persistent rent 
incomes from that of repeated incidences of good luck. To solve this problem, multiple 
inheritance tax rates may be necessary. 
 More importantly, households in some FLs can obtain larger amounts of rent 
income more often than those in other FLs, as discussed in Section 2.2. If an inheritance 
tax consists of only a single tax rate and this single rate is applied commonly to all 
heterogeneous FLs, SH may not be achieved. In practice, inheritance taxes have the 
property of progressiveness in many countries.  
 
4.5.2  Rationale for progressiveness 
A multi-FL model is used to examine the necessity of progressiveness because 
progressiveness only matters when there are multiple heterogeneous FLs with regard to 
persistent rent incomes. Suppose that there are M FLs (FL1, FL2, …, FLM) that are 
identical except for the persistent rent incomes zt that households obtain. M is an even 
number for a technical reason. For simplicity, assume there is only one household in each 
FL, and that any generation of household in a FL equally lives only one period. If 𝑖 ≤ 𝑀2 , 
the household in FLi obtains persistent rent incomes in every period (i.e., in every 
generation). The amount of persistent rent income after paying the income tax is  
 ?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖 = 𝑧𝑅,𝑖 
 
in every period, and ?̃?𝑖 is 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 at SH in the case where there is no persistent rent income 
for any FL. It is assumed for simplicity that 𝑧𝑅,𝑖 is constant for any 𝑖 ≤ 𝑀2 , and 𝑧𝑅,𝑖 >𝑧𝑅,𝑗  if i < j.10 Conversely, if 𝑗 > 𝑀2 , the incomes of household in FLj decreases by ?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑀−𝑗+1  in every period before the government transfers the money from the 
inheritance tax to the household in FLj. Here, suppose for simplicity that ?̃?𝑖 is identical 
for any i (= 1, 2, …, M) and therefore ?̌?𝑖 > ?̌?𝑗 if i < j.    
 Because any generation of a household lives only one period, the inheritance tax 
is imposed in every period. The amount of inheritance tax for household in FLq (ITq) for 
q = 1, 2, …, M is  
  𝐼𝑇𝑞 = 𝛿(𝑘𝑞,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑞𝑘𝑞,𝑡 − ?̅?) . 
                                                          
10
 If a more general environment is assumed such that there are many households in a FL, 𝑧𝑅,𝑖 > 𝑧𝑅,𝑗 
means that a household in FLi can obtain persistent rent incomes more frequently than once in FLj because 
households can obtain rent incomes only intermittently.  
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The tax exemption (?̅?) is set to satisfy   
 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑖𝑘𝑀−𝑗+1,𝑡 < ?̅? < 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑖𝑘𝑖,𝑡 
 
for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ) and 𝑗 (> 𝑀2 ). If ITq is negative, the inheritance tax of a household in 
FLq is exempted. Therefore, because of this inheritance tax, the capital owned by the 
household in FL𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ) is reduced from ?̃?1,𝑡 = 𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑖𝑘1,𝑡 to (1 − 𝛿)(𝑘1,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑖𝑘1,𝑡). 
On the other hand, capital owned by the household in FL𝑗 (> 𝑀2 ) is unchanged (i.e., 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑖𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ) before the government transfers the money from the revenue of the 
inheritance tax to the household in FL𝑗 (> 𝑀2 ) appropriately to achieve SH. With the 
transfers, the capital owned by the household in FL𝑗 (> 𝑀2 ) increases to greater than 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 − ?̌?𝑖𝑘𝑗,𝑡.  
 By a similar procedure as shown in Section 4.3, if the tax rate were set to 
 𝛿 = ?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 − ?̅? 
for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), then  
 lim𝑚→∞𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝑚 = ?̃?𝑖                                                     (9) 
 
could be satisfied. However, because ?̌?𝑖 is heterogeneous, there is no value of δ that can 
satisfy equation (9) for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ). Conversely, to make equation (9) hold for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), the inheritance tax rate applied to each FL should be heterogeneous across FLs.  
 Hence, I next examine the case of heterogeneous inheritance tax rates. Let 𝛿𝑖 
be the inheritance tax rate for FL𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ). Clearly, if   
 𝛿𝑖 = ?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 − ?̅?                                                 (10) 
 
is satisfied for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), equation (9) holds simultaneously for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ). If the 
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government at the same time transfers the money from the inheritance tax to the 
household in FL𝑗 (> 𝑀2 ) appropriately, SH can be achieved. Note that if ?̅? > ?̃?𝑖  for 
households in some FL𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), a δi that satisfies equation (10) cannot be set for these 
FLs because δi ≤ 1. 
 Because  
  𝜕𝛿𝑖𝜕?̌?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖(?̃?𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̌?𝑖?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 − ?̅?)2  , 
 
if ?̃?𝑖 − ?̅? > 0 for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), 
  𝜕𝛿𝑖𝜕?̌?𝑖 > 0 . 
 
Therefore, as the amount of inheritance becomes larger, the inheritance tax rate applied 
to it should increase to achieve SH. That is, inheritance tax rates should be progressive. 
 
4.5.3  Another rationale  
There is another rationale for the need for a progressive inheritance tax. As discussed in 
Section 4.5.1, because the problem of distinguishing between the persistent and 
temporary elements of capital still exists to some extent, if the amount of capital owned 
by a household is not sufficiently larger than the average, it will be difficult to distinguish 
the effect of persistent rent incomes on capital from the effect of repeated good luck. In 
this case, a government may be still cautious about setting 𝛿𝑖 as indicated by equation 
(10).  
 However, if the amount of capital of a household is sufficiently greater than 
average, it will be easier to distinguish between them because good fortune does not 
generally repeat for a long period (i.e., for many generations). A much larger capital 
amount than average indicates that it is highly likely that the capital was accumulated as 
a result of persistent rent incomes. As the amount of capital increases, the probability that 
it was accumulated owing to persistent rent incomes will also increase. Hence, it seems 
quite reasonable to set a higher inheritance tax rate for a larger amount of inherited capital 
and a lower rate for a smaller amount.  
 An important implication of this rationale is that inheritance tax rates should vary 
depending not on ?̌?𝑖 but on the amount of capital inherited.  
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4.6  Actual progressive inheritance tax  
In many countries, inheritance tax rates do indeed vary depending on the amount of 
capital inherited, as discussed in Section 4.5.3 and most likely for the same reasons. This 
kind of inheritance tax is important as a “next best” inheritance tax while the inheritance 
tax whose rates vary depending on ?̌?𝑖 would be the “best” inheritance tax if it is feasible, 
and I examine this “next best” inheritance tax in this section.  
 
4.6.1  Inheritance tax rates that vary depending on the amount of 
capital inherited 
Suppose there is an inheritance tax, and the rates vary depending on 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + ?̌?𝑖𝑘𝑖,𝑡. The tax 
rates are T1, T2, and T3, and 0 < T1 < T2 < T3 < 1. The tax exemption is set such that ?̃?𝑖 >?̅? for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ). The environment assumed in this section is basically the same as that 
in Section 4.5.2, but there are N households in each FL, rather than one. In addition, the 
amount of persistent rent incomes is commonly z for any household and for any period, 
where z is a constant, but the probability that a household in FLi obtains z (pi) is different 
across FLs such that       
 𝑝𝑖 = 2(𝑀 + 1 − 𝑖)𝑁𝑀(𝑀 + 1)                                                 (11) 
 
while 
  𝑁 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑀𝑖=1 = 1 . 
 
Equation (11) indicates that as i becomes smaller, the probability becomes higher, and 
that a household in FLi obtains z in every 
𝑁𝑀(𝑀+1)2(𝑀+1−𝑖) generations on average. Hence, 
FL1 has the highest probability among the FLs, and the probability that a household 
obtains z in FL1 is  
  𝑝1 = 2𝑁(𝑀 + 1)  , 
 
which means that it obtains z once in 
𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations. For simplicity, also suppose 
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that it always obtains z exactly once in every 
𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations. 
 
4.6.2  The nature of this inheritance tax  
First, I examine a special case where the inheritance tax rate is only T1 for comparison. 
Because the tax rate is only T1,  
 𝑘1,1 = (𝑘1,0 + 𝑧𝑅 − ?̅?)(1 − 𝑇1) + ?̅? 𝑘1,2 = (𝑘1,1 − ?̅?)(1 − 𝑇1) + ?̅? 𝑘1,3 = (𝑘1,2 − ?̅?)(1 − 𝑇1) + ?̅? 
. 
.  𝑘1,𝑡 = (𝑘1,𝑡−1 − ?̅?)(1 − 𝑇1) + ?̅? , 
 
and thereby,  
 𝑘1,𝑡 = (𝑘1,0 + 𝑧𝑅 − ?̅?)(1 − 𝑇1)𝑡 + ?̅? .                                 (12) 
 
 If T1 is set sufficiently high, by equation (12),  
 𝑘1,𝑣 ≅ ?̅? ,                                                         (13) 
 
where 𝑣 = 𝑁(𝑀+1)2 − 1 because 0 < 1 − 𝑇1 < 1. Because ?̃?𝑖 > ?̅? for any 𝑖 (≤ 𝑀2 ), 
the state indicated by equation (13) is inconsistent with SH and means that households in 
FL1 are eventually made poorer than they are at SH because of the inheritance tax. 
However, if T1 is set sufficiently low, it will take a long time (many generations) to reach 
the state indicated by equation (13). Hence, a household in FL1 can obtain z again after 𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations, that is, before reaching the state indicated by equation (13). If T1 
is set sufficiently low, therefore, a household in FL1 never reaches the state indicated by 
equation (13). As a result, a household in FL1 can accumulate a larger amount of 𝑘1,𝑡 
than it would at SH and eventually monopolize all capital in the economy.  
 Next, I examine the case of multiple tax rates T1, T2, and T3. Suppose that T1, T2, 
and T3 are set such that  
 
                   T1 on 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 when 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 > ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 
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T2 on 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 when ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ ≥ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 > ?̅?𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 
                   T3 on 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 when ?̅?𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 ≥ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 > ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 
 
so as to reach the state 𝑘1,𝑡 = ?̃?1  just after 𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations where ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ >?̅?𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 > ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤. If T1 is set sufficiently high, 𝑘1,𝑡 decreases rapidly to ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ but after 
it reaches ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, the tax rate applied is changed downwards to T2, and after it reaches ?̅?𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒, the lowest rate T3 is applied to the remaining 𝑘1,𝑡.  
 An important advantage of this type of inheritance tax is that a government can 
more easily make 𝑘1,𝑡 land softly on ?̃?1 just after 𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations. Because T1 
can be set sufficiently high, it will not take a long time (i.e., many generations) for 𝑘1,𝑡 
to reach ?̅?𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ, but because T3 can be set sufficiently low, it will take a long time (many 
generations) before reaching 𝑘1,𝑡 ≅ ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 . Hence, before reaching 𝑘1,𝑡 ≅ ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 , the 
government has enough time to adjust or fine-tune T1 , T2, and T3 as needed even if the 
initial values of T1 , T2, and T3 do not necessary exactly cause 𝑘1,𝑡 = ?̃?1 to be realized 
immediately after 
𝑁(𝑀+1)2  generations. Because soft landings are possible, this “next 
best” inheritance tax appears to be sufficiently useful. 
 However, being useful does not mean that this inheritance tax system has no 
drawbacks. Households in FLi ( ≥ 2) experience periods (generations) of 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < ?̃?𝑖 and 
as i increases, more generations will experience 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < ?̃?𝑖 because commonly applied tax 
rates T1 , T2, and T3 have been set so as to make 𝑘1,𝑡 = ?̃?1 immediately after 𝑁(𝑀+1)2  
generations. Because the interval of obtaining z between generations of a household in 
FLi (≥ 2) is longer than that of a household in FL1, 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 of a household in FLi (≥ 2) will 
be reduced to 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 < ?̃?𝑖 before a future generation again obtains z while any generation 
of a household in FL1 can enjoy 𝑘1,𝑡 ≥ ?̃?1.  
 Nevertheless, many households in FLs other than FL1 can receive the transfers 
with regard to the inheritance tax from the government during some generations. In 
addition, and more importantly, if ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 is set such that it is not too different from ?̃?𝑖 
(but still ?̃?𝑖 > ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤), households of FLs other than FL1 can at least keep 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 ≅?̃?𝑖. It should be possible for a government to set ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 such that it is not too different 
from ?̃?𝑖  because the indistinguishability problem is less severe in the case of the 
inheritance tax than it is in the case of the income tax. Therefore, a government will be 
able to roughly estimate the correct amount of accumulated capital resulting from 
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persistent rent incomes. As a result, differences in 𝑘𝑖,𝑡  among households do not 
accelerate; 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 will be less than ?̃?𝑖 during some generations, but it will be maintained 
around ?̃?𝑖 for any i (≥ 2) indefinitely.  
 There are many other variations of this “next best” inheritance tax. For example, 
some may argue that a scheme where ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 is set to be the average 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 of all households 
and T1 , T2, and T3 are set to reach the state 𝑘1,𝑡 = ?̅?𝐿𝑜𝑤 immediately after 𝑁(𝑀+1)2  
generations is more favorable. Which variation should be adopted should be decided 
through the various political processes in democratic countries.    
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Whether inheritance taxes can be justified economically has remained an open question. 
Most studies of the rationale for inheritance tax have been confined within the traditional 
framework of the theory of optimal taxation. In this paper, I examined it from a different 
perspective—that of rent incomes derived from ranking value and preference at SH 
(Harashima, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b).  
 Because there are many different FLs that have different probabilities of 
obtaining persistent rent incomes, SH cannot be achieved unless some of the capital 
accumulation of the more advantaged FLs are compulsorily restrained through 
government interventions. One such tool is the income tax, but it is difficult for a 
government to be completely successful relying only on an income tax because a 
government cannot perfectly distinguish between persistent rent incomes and other types 
of income. Therefore, another type of tax is needed. In this paper, I showed that, if an 
inheritance tax with an appropriate tax exemption and tax rates is introduced, the 
drawbacks of an income tax can be overcome and SH can be achieved. In this sense, an 
inheritance tax is necessary to achieve SH and may even be considered as the final safety 
net to achieve it.  
 Inheritance tax rates should be set according to the probabilities of obtaining 
persistent rent incomes, but this will be difficult to do in practice because it is still difficult 
to distinguish between the different elements of capital (e.g., persistent and 
temporary/lucky). A next best solution is to impose an inheritance tax with rates that vary 
depending on the amounts of capital (assets) households inherit. Although not perfect, 
SH can be approximately achieved under this type of inheritance tax system.  
 An important point is that the inheritance tax is not a tax on capital income—it 
is a tax on rents. Because SH indicates optimality in a heterogeneous population, this type 
of inheritance tax does not distort the economy. Rather, unless the negative effects of 
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these rents are sufficiently removed by an inheritance tax, the economy is distorted and 
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